期刊简介
《国际安全》（International Security）由麻省理工学院出版社出版，发表有关当代安全问题的文章。文章涉及传统的战争与和平主题，以及安全层面最新的问题，包括环境、人口、人道主义问题、跨国网络和新兴技术。40多年来，《国际安全》为美国国家安全政策的辩论和国际安全事务的研究提供了理论指导。该期刊重视挑战传统智慧、研究政策、参与理论、阐明历史和发现新趋势的学术研究。2023年该期刊的影响因子为4.8。
本期目录
1
战争与国际政治
War and International Politics
2
对冲霸权：关于如何应对中国的现实主义辩论
Hedging on Hegemony: The Realist Debate over How to Respond to China
3
中美太空军事平衡
The U.S.-China Military Balance in Space
4
僧侣行为恶劣：解释亚洲佛教徒的暴力行为
Monks Behaving Badly: Explaining Buddhist Violence in Asia
5
在传播中迷失：国际政治中的官僚主义、声音和沟通
Lost in Transmission: Bureaucracy, Noise, and Communication in International Politics Open Access
内容摘要
战争与国际政治
题目：War and International Politics
作者： John J. Mearsheimer，美国政治学家、国际关系学者。
摘要：随着单极世界走向终结，中国、俄罗斯和美国等大国之间重新回归安全竞争态势。鉴于敌对大国之间爆发战争的可能性，本文旨在对大国战争进行分析。作者认为，由于政治的本质是一种冲突性活动，其背后始终存在着暴力的可能性，因此战争是国际体系中的主要特征。这一论点与卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨（Carl von Clausewitz）的著名观点（战争是政治以其他方式的延伸）不同，在国际关系文献中很少被提及。作者探讨政治与战争之间的相互作用如何影响国家发动和进行武装冲突的方式。国家发动战争的限制是什么？政治和军事因素又是如何导致战争升级的？作者认为，几乎不可能对国家发动战争的时间进行有效限制，而且战争极有可能摆脱政治控制而升级。
With the end of unipolarity, security competition among the great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—is back with a vengeance. Given the possibility of war between rival great powers, the purpose of this article is to analyze great power war. My central claim is that war is the dominant feature of life in the international system, mainly because of the nature of politics. In particular, politics is a fundamentally conflictual enterprise with the ever-present possibility of violence in the background. This argument, which differs from Carl von Clausewitz's famous claim that war is an extension of politics by other means, is rarely made in the international relations literature. I examine how the interplay between politics and war affects how states both initiate and conduct armed conflict. What are the limits on states starting wars, and how do political and military factors contribute to their escalation? I argue that it is almost impossible to put meaningful limits on when states can start wars, and that there is a powerful tendency for wars to escape political control and escalate.
对冲霸权：关于如何应对中国的现实主义辩论
题目：Hedging on Hegemony: The Realist Debate over How to Respond to China
作者：Stephen M. Walt，哈佛大学国际关系学教授。
摘要：地区霸权是一个现实主义概念，旨在解释大国之间以及大国如何应对周边环境。现实主义的不同派别对地区霸权是否可行以及各国是否应该积极追求这一目标存在分歧。对于进攻性现实主义者而言，国际体系的无政府状态以及无法揣测他国意图的现状，迫使各国追求相对实力最大化，并试图成为其所在地区唯一的大国。他们预测大国战争更有可能爆发，因为中国将试图在亚洲建立霸权，而美国将试图阻止其这样做。相比之下，防御性现实主义者则认为，争夺霸权的行为通常会受到强大平衡联盟的阻挠。防御性现实主义者的观点更为有力：在现代，美国是唯一一个没有受到强大平衡联盟阻挠其霸权争夺的大国。美国之所以成功，是因为北美的条件异常有利；而中国则没有类似的优势。中国试图称霸亚洲的企图很可能会失败。因此，美国领导人可以采取审慎的策略来应对这一危险，在与中国合作建立更稳定的地区秩序的同时，促进美国亚洲盟友对中国的平衡作用。
Regional hegemony is a realist concept explaining how great powers deal with each other and with their immediate surroundings. Realism's competing strands disagree on whether regional hegemony is a feasible objective, and on whether states should actively pursue this goal. For offensive realists, the international system's anarchic structure and the impossibility of gauging others' intentions compel states to maximize relative power and try to become the only great power in their region. They predict that a great power war is more likely because China will try to establish hegemony in Asia and the United States will try to prevent it from doing so. By contrast, defensive realists maintain that bids for hegemony are usually thwarted by powerful balancing coalitions. Defensive realists have the stronger case: In modern times, the United States is the only great power whose bid for hegemony was not thwarted by a powerful balancing coalition. The United States succeeded because conditions in North America were unusually favorable; China does not enjoy similar advantages. A Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia is likely to fail and Beijing would be unwise to attempt it. U.S. leaders can therefore adopt a measured approach to this danger, facilitating balancing behavior by the United States' Asian partners while working with China to create a more stable regional order.
中美太空军事平衡
题目：The U.S.-China Military Balance in Space
作者：Zachary Burdette，美国兰德公司研究员。
摘要：美军日益加强对太空资源的利用以支持自身作战，对手也不断增强太空对抗能力，这种情况将如何影响力量平衡？本文构建了一个评估中美太空军事平衡的框架，并将其应用于台湾地区的局势。文章评估了美军对太空“保卫”台湾地区的依赖程度，以及美国卫星应对中国太空对抗行动的韧性。研究结果强调了中国军事现代化和扩张给美军带来的一些挑战，但也警告不应夸大威胁的严重程度。研究结果对未来态势持乐观态度，由于美军的韧性较强，太空仍然是美军的重要资产，而非主要负担。但中国军方的韧性也逐步上升，这将给美国在对抗中国利用太空支持自身军事行动方面带来新的挑战。
How will the U.S. military's growing use of space to support its operations and the growing counterspace capabilities available to its rivals shape the balance of power? This article develops a framework to assess the U.S.-China military balance in space and applies that framework to a Taiwan scenario. It evaluates trends in both the U.S. military's dependence on space to defend Taiwan and the resilience of U.S. satellite constellations against a Chinese counterspace campaign. The findings highlight some of the challenges that China's military modernization and expansion have created for the U.S. military, but they caution against overstating the magnitude of the threat. The findings also support qualified optimism about the future: Encouraging trends in resilience will enable space to remain a major asset rather than a major liability for the U.S. military. But the Chinese military will also benefit from these positive trends in resilience, which will create new challenges for the United States in countering China's use of space to support its own military operations.
僧侣行为恶劣：解释亚洲佛教徒的暴力行为
题目：Monks Behaving Badly: Explaining Buddhist Violence in Asia
作者：Nilay Saiya，南洋理工大学公共政策与全球事务副教授；Stuti Manchanda，南洋理工大学博士生。
摘要：冷战结束以来，全球宗教暴力事件频发，促使学者们试图解释与宗教相关的暴力极端主义。现代世界对宗教暴力的关注主要集中在伊斯兰教上。在世界主要宗教传统中，佛教普遍与和平、宽容和慈悲联系在一起。然而，佛教与其他所有伟大宗教一样，也有暴力的一面。虽然学者们承认佛教内部存在暴力，但很少有人探究为什么佛教在某些地方会变得暴力，而在其他地方却不会。作者对佛教暴力事件提出了一个结构性解释。文章认为，佛教暴力事件往往发生在政教结合的国家。我们通过对佛教占多数和佛教多元国家的佛教暴力事件进行统计分析，以及对缅甸、新加坡、斯里兰卡和泰国佛教暴力事件（及其反面）的案例研究，来检验这一理论。研究结果表明，政教融合会鼓励佛教治安维持者攻击宗教少数群体。各国可以采取具体措施来降低暴力宗教极端主义的风险。
The dramatic rise in religious violence across the globe since the end of the Cold War has motivated scholars to try to explain violent religion-related extremism. Much of the attention to religious violence in the modern world focuses on Islam. Of the world's major faith traditions, Buddhism is most commonly and widely associated with peace, tolerance, and compassion. Yet Buddhism, like every other great religion, has a violent side. While scholars acknowledge violence within Buddhism, few have explored why Buddhism becomes violent in some places but not others. We develop a structural explanation for Buddhist violence. Our central claim is that Buddhist violence tends to occur in countries where Buddhism and the state are closely intertwined. We test this theory using both a statistical analysis of Buddhist violence in Buddhist-majority and Buddhist-plural countries and case studies of Buddhist violence (or lack thereof) in Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Our findings show that religion-state integration emboldens Buddhist vigilantes to attack religious minorities. Our analysis suggests that states can take specific actions to mitigate the risk of violent religious extremism.
在传播中迷失：国际政治中的官僚主义、噪音和沟通
题目：Lost in Transmission: Bureaucracy, Noise, and Communication in International Politics
作者：Don Casler，伊利诺伊大学政治学助理教授；Tyler Jost，布朗大学政治学助理教授。
摘要：有效的沟通往往决定着国家是开战还是维持和平。然而，一个国家的决策者常常无法理解另一个国家决策者的意图。国际沟通在什么情况下会失效？作者认为，政府内部的分工可能会导致信息传播出现噪音，从而降低国际沟通的效率。传播噪音是指官僚机构向外国发出的信号偏离领导人的本意。官僚机构的结构是指领导人和官僚如何互动的正式和非正式规则及程序，其会影响传播噪音的严重程度。开放机构通过改善领导者和官僚之间的信息共享来减少这种模糊不清的情况，封闭机构通过阻碍信息共享和官僚监督来增加迷惑性。简而言之，国家内部的沟通模式塑造了国家之间的沟通效率。文章通过分析20世纪60年代中期印度体制改革前后的官僚信号传递过程来评估这一理论。针对1962年印度与中国以及1965年印度与巴基斯坦的谈判案例，文章利用来自六个国家的资料，阐明信息发送方的制度如何降低沟通质量。相关理论和研究结果强调了传播噪音和官僚体系在国际沟通中扮演的重要角色，尽管这些角色相对容易被忽视。
Effective communications are often the difference between whether states go to war or remain at peace. Yet decision-makers in one state frequently fail to understand what decision-makers in another are trying to say. Under what conditions do international communications fail? We argue that division of labor within government can degrade international communication by introducing transmission noise, which occurs when bureaucracies dispatch signals to foreign countries that deviate from the leader's intended meaning. The structure of bureaucratic institutions—the formal and informal rules and procedures defining how leaders and bureaucrats interact—affects the severity of transmission noise. Open institutions reduce transmission noise by improving information-sharing between leaders and bureaucrats; closed institutions increase transmission noise by impeding information-sharing and bureaucratic oversight. In short, patterns of communication within states shape communication effectiveness between states. We evaluate the theory by analyzing bureaucratic signaling processes before and after institutional reforms in India in the mid-1960s. For the cases on India's negotiations with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965, we leverage sources from six countries to illustrate how sender-side institutions can degrade communication. The theory and findings emphasize the important but relatively overlooked roles that transmission noise and bureaucracy play in international communication.
编译：刘睿琦，国政学人编译员，毕业于都柏林大学政治与国际关系学院。
审校 | 张潇文 赖永祯
排版 | 崔竞丹
本文源于International Security, Vol. 49, No.4, Spring 2025. 本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。
