期刊简介

《安全研究》（Security Studies）收录出版创新性的学术稿件——无论是理论研究、实践经验分享还是两者兼而有之。安全研究包含广泛的议题，从核扩散、核威慑、军民关系、战略文化、种族冲突、流行病与国家安全、民主政治、外交决策到定性与多方法研究的发展。2024年该期刊影响因子为2.464。

本期目录

1

购买生存：为何领导者会雇佣私人军队？

Buying Survival: Why Do Leaders Hire Mercenaries?

2

外国基地市场

The Market for Foreign Bases

3

恐怖组织的致命目标和适应失败

Lethal Targeting and Adaptation Failure in Terrorist Groups

4

中俄军事协作及其对全球安全的影响

Sino-Russian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security

5

公众对内战后权力争夺的支持

Public Support for Power Grabs after Civil Conflict

内容摘要

购买生存：为何领导者会雇佣私人军队？

题目：Buying Survival: Why Do Leaders Hire Mercenaries?

作者：Leonardo Gentil-Fernandes，马里兰大学政治学系博士后；Kelly Morrison, 田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校政治学系助理教授；Jacob Otto, 匹兹堡大学政治学系博士生。

摘要：雇佣军在国际与国内安全中发挥着愈发重要的作用。为什么领导者会雇佣私人军队？本文认为领导者利用私人军事组织来预防政变的风险，但前提是这些领导者与国际社会的联系比较薄弱。虽然雇佣军可以分散国内军事能力，来作为一项必要的政变预防功能，但鉴于反对使用雇佣军的强有力规范，它们也使得某些领导者面临国际社会的谴责。我们在不同国家和时期找到了对本文理论的有力支撑：政变风险高、国际问责低的领导者极有可能雇佣私人军队。本文的理论和发现为私人军事组织对国内社会的重要性提供了独特的见解。

Mercenaries play an increasingly important role in international and domestic security. Why do leaders hire mercenaries? We argue that leaders employ private military organizations to guard against the risk of coups, but only when these leaders have weak ties to the international community. While mercenaries can diffuse domestic military capacity, an essential coup-proofing function, they also put some leaders at risk of international opprobrium given strong norms against their use. We find support for our theory across countries and over time: Leaders with high coup risk and low international accountability are especially likely to hire mercenaries. Our theory and findings provide unique insight into the importance of private military organizations for domestic security.

国外基地市场

题目：The Market for Foreign Bases

作者：Renanah Miles Joyce，美国马萨诸塞州沃尔瑟姆布兰代斯大学政治学助理教授；Brian Blankenshi，美国佛罗里达州科勒尔盖布尔斯迈阿密大学政治学助理教授。

摘要：权力投射是国家施加影响的主要手段。传统观点认为在第三方竞争者存在的条件下，国家会为国外基地支付更多的费用，但竞争影响基地成本的机制在理论上既没有得到充分说明，在实证上也没有得到充分的研究。本文测试了竞争影响准入价格的机制：拒绝、挤出和信息机制。本文使用美国薪酬和基地的新数据以及美国在吉布提的定性证据来研究美国在非洲的行为。研究结果表明，中国的经济激励措施已经挤掉了美国经济激励措施在确保准入方面的有效性。本文进一步表明，由于美国努力去限制其竞争对手的准入和吉布提对本国地产价值的了解，随着其他寻求基地者进入市场，吉布提领导人升级了它们对美国补偿的要求。

Power projection is a central means by which states exert influence. Conventional wisdom holds that states pay more for foreign bases in the presence of third-party competitors, yet the mechanisms by which competition shapes the costs of bases are both theoretically underspecified and empirically understudied. This article tests three mechanisms by which competition can shape the price of access: denial, crowding out, and information. We study the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on US compensation and bases and qualitative evidence from the US presence in Djibouti. Our findings suggest that China’s economic incentives have crowded out the effectiveness of US economic incentives in securing access. We further show that Djiboutian leaders escalated their demands for US compensation as other base-seekers entered the market due to a combination of US efforts to limit its rivals’ access and Djibouti’s learning about the value of its real estate.

恐怖组织的致命目标和适应失败

题目：Lethal Targeting and Adaptation Failure in Terrorist Groups

作者：Bryce Loidolt，国防大学国家战略研究所高级研究员。

摘要：假设恐怖组织希望快速发展，它们必须经常适应致命目标打击。随着时间的推移，恐怖分子头目可以确认逃避或者削弱国家监控能力的对策。较低水平的特工通常会阻止他们实施这些调整，然而头目因此必须要强制执行。具有分散指挥关系的小组组长难以直接实施监控和执行合规性。可支配资源有限的领导人也无法投资官僚主义能力来约束特工的行为。当国家监控能力增强时，这些组织性缺陷的成本将异常高昂。作者通过研究乌萨马·本·拉登总部与巴基斯坦无人机行动有关的阿拉伯语书信为本文提供了论点支撑。作者的论点为有关适应性的理论和作战技术的强制力做出了一定贡献。它还表明，先进的监视和打击能力可能不足促使未来的反恐行动成功。

If terrorist organizations wish to thrive, they often must adapt to lethal targeting. Over time, terrorist leaders can identify countermeasures that evade or erode state surveillance capabilities. Lower-level operatives will resist implementing these adaptations, however, so leaders must enforce their implementation. Leaders of groups with decentralized command relationships will struggle to directly monitor and enforce compliance. Leaders with limited resources at their disposal will also be unable to invest in the bureaucratic capacity to discipline operatives’ behavior. These organizational deficiencies become increasingly costly when state surveillance capabilities increase. I find support for this thesis by examining Arabic language correspondence from Usama bin Ladin’s compound related to the drone campaign in Pakistan. My argument contributes to theories of adaptation and the coercive power of warfighting technologies. It also suggests that advanced surveillance and strike capabilities may be insufficient for future counterterrorism success.

中俄军事协作及其对全球安全的影响

题目：Sino-Russian Military Alignment and Its Implications for Global Security

作者：Oriana Skylar Mastro，弗里曼·斯波格利国际问题研究所中心研究员和斯坦福大学政治学助理教授。

摘要原文：What is the nature and impact of Sino-Russian alignment? What are the conditions under which each is likely to support the other militarily and with what type of support? To answer these questions, this article presents a novel alignment framework that best captures war fighting capabilities and how great powers align and determines the values of each indicator based on English, Chinese and Russian sources. I argue that China and Russia are significantly aligned and trending towards an even more extensive alignment relationship. However, the scope of their military alignment is limited to facilitating China’s challenge of US hegemony in Asia. Additionally, Russian support comes in the form of enhancing China’s independent combat capacity and potentially providing support functions in wartime but does not extend to direct involvement. These findings have implications for the literature on alignment, deterrence calculations and our understanding of Russian and Chinese strategic thinking.

公众对内战后权力争夺的支持

题目：Public Support for Power Grabs after Civil Conflict

作者：James Igoe Walsh，北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校政治学、数据科学和公共政策教授；Sam Whitt，海波因特大学政治学教授；Jacob Aronson，马里兰大学国际发展与冲突管理中心的助理研究科学家；Jonathan Hall，乌普萨拉大学和平与冲突研究系副教授兼高级讲师；Paul Huth，马里兰大学政府与政治系教授；Vera Mironova，中东研究所独立研究员。

摘要：权力分享是在竞争对手之间达成可持续协议的公认策略。然而，当一方夺取权力时，权力分享措施经常会遭到违反。本文研究了伊拉克摩苏尔地方警务背景下公众对权力分享与权力夺取的看法。在一项调查实验中，作者在调查中询问受访者是否认为，在伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国(ISIS)占领之后，摩苏尔的安全在权力分享与权力攫取处理下得到加强或降低，即改变了反伊斯兰国联盟的不同派系所拥有的权力。在治安和安全问题上，公众更有可能支持权力攫取，而不是权力分享。在权力攫取的情况下，冲突受害现象也具有重要的调节作用。与非受害者不同，冲突受害者喜欢通过内部群体的权力争夺来加强当地的宗派控制、非常重视稳定性、甚至欢迎来自外部的控制，以遏制可能存在分歧的群体之间的权力分享。本文的研究结果强调了将冲突后建设和平的权力分享机制制度化所面临的挑战。

Power-sharing is a recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements among rivals. However, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side grabs power. We examine public perceptions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a survey experiment, we investigate if -individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under power-sharing versus power-grabbing treatments, which vary the authority held by distinct factions of the counter-ISIS coalition. The public is more likely to support power-grabbing than power-sharing in matters of policing and security. In the case of power-grabbing, there are also important moderating effects of conflict-related victimization. Unlike nonvictims who favor ingroup power-grabbing to enhance local ¬sectarian control, victims place a premium on stability, welcoming even external, out-group control over power-sharing among groups who might be at odds. Our results underscore the challenges of institutionalizing power-sharing mechanisms for peacebuilding after conflict.

编译 | 林志俊

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 郭洪纾

本文源于《安全研究》2024年第2期，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。