期刊简介
《国际组织评论》（The Review of International Organizations）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊，始发刊于2006年，由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为3.9，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名第12。
本期目录
1
国际合作的生命周期: 特刊简介
The life cycle of international cooperation: Introduction to the special issue
2
经济危机与国际组织的生存
Economic crises and the survival of international organizations
3
改革还是取代？继承作为政府间组织制度变迁的一种机制
To reform or to replace? Succession as a mechanism of institutional change in intergovernmental organisations
4
联合国大会领导人：振兴还是政治化？
Leaders in the United Nations General Assembly: Revitalization or politicization?
5
扩大还是捍卫合法性？为什么国际组织加强自我合法化
Expanding or defending legitimacy? Why international organizations intensify self-legitimation
6
条约的退出和国际法的发展
Treaty withdrawal and the development of international law
7
公众支持退出国际组织：来自美国的实验证据
Public support for withdrawal from international organizations: Experimental evidence from the US
内容摘要
国际合作的生命周期: 特刊简介
题目：The life cycle of international cooperation: Introduction to the special issue
作者：Julia Gray，宾夕法尼亚大学政治学副教授。
摘要：国际组织的生命往往远远超过其最初签订成立协议那一刻。国际组织如何适应其成员国的不断变化、全球地缘政治的变化，甚至是国际组织自身的内部变化？本期关于国际合作的生命周期的特刊探讨了支撑国际体系的国际组织的兴衰。企业理论、组织社会学以及代理理论都将简化生命周期的观点纳入到了国际组织研究之中，然而国际关系研究并未完全利用这些理论框架。生命周期方法的核心在于：首先将国际组织自身作为分析的核心单元，其次是国际组织内部的动态过程，包括诸如虚假启动、巩固、惯性、发展、振兴、死亡以及继承等生命阶段。将这些动态过程融入我们对国际组织的理解中提醒我们，从历史上看国际组织总是经历繁荣与衰弱的时期。对于彻底理解国际体系的活力与韧性来说，把握主导这些变化的机制是不可或缺的。本期特刊的文章探索了国际组织面对危机时的持久性，国际组织为使自身存在合法化的措施，个人领导者的言论在国际组织活力中的作用，成员在退出国际组织与创建新机构之间面临的权衡，成员退出国际组织对整个国际体系的影响以及大众对这种退出的看法。
International organizations’ lives often extend far beyond the moment of their initial contracting. How IOs do adapt to shifting circumstances in their member states global geopolitical changes, and even internal dynamics within the IO itself? This special issue on the life cycle of international cooperation explores the ebbs and flows of the IOs that underpin the international system. Firm theory, organizational sociology, and agency theory all have incorporated life cycles perspectives into the study of organizations, but IR has yet to fully harness these frameworks. A life cycles approach centers on, first, incorporating the IO itself as the core unit of analysis and, second, the dynamic processes within IOs — including life stages such as false starts, consolidation, inertia, growth, revitalization, death, and succession. Incorporating these dynamic processes into our understanding of IOs reminds us that historically, IOs have always experienced periods of both flourishing and faltering. Grasping the mechanisms that drive these changes is indispensable for a thorough understanding of the international system’s vitality and resilience. Articles in this issue explore the durability of IOs in the face of crises; the measures that IOs deploy to legitimize their existence; the role of individual leaders’ rhetoric in IO vitality; the tradeoffs that member states face between pulling the plug on an IO versus creating a new institution; the effect of member-state IO withdrawal on the international system overall; and the mass public’s perceptions of such withdrawals.
经济危机与国际组织的生存
题目：Economic crises and the survival of international organizations
作者：Yoram Z. Haftel，耶路撒冷希伯来大学国际关系系教授；Bar Nadel，耶路撒冷希伯来大学国际关系系博士研究生。
摘要：经济困难时期如何影响各国的外交政策，尤其是其国际承诺？尽管大量文献假设经济危机会导致以国际合作为代价而优先考虑国内政治，但这些说法很少受到系统的实证检验。本研究考察了这些关系的一个重要方面：经济危机的后果对国际组织的生存。这个问题迄今为止鲜少引起学术界关注。理论上，我们认为尽管经济危机会弱化成员国对国际组织的承诺，他们还强调其有能力解决此类危机的根源，减轻其最有害的影响。因此，经济危机实际上可以延长国际组织的持续时间。本文预计，考虑到具有经济任务的国际组织以及地区性国际组织在经济困难时期对国际合作的特殊意义，上述这种影响在货币危机中尤其明显。本文利用1970年至2014年国际组织以及关于货币、银行和主权债务危机数据的全面样本对这些猜测进行了检验。使用事件历史模型和控制其余关于国际组织生存的替代性解释，本文发现了充足的经验支持的理论预期。
How do hard economic times affect countries’ foreign policy and, specifically, their international commitments? Although a large body of literature assumes that economic crises lead to the prioritization of domestic politics at the expense of international cooperation, these claims are rarely subjected to systematic empirical tests. This study examines one important aspect of these relationships: the consequences of economic crises for the survival of international organizations (IOs), a question that attracted only scant scholarly attention to date. Theoretically, we argue that even though economic crises can weaken member states’ commitment to IOs, they also underscore their ability to tackle the root causes of such crises and mitigate their most pernicious effects. As such, economic crises are actually conducive to IO longevity. We expect this effect to be especially pronounced for currency crises, IOs with an economic mandate, and regional IOs, given their particular relevance for international cooperation during hard economic times. These conjectures are tested with a comprehensive sample of IOs and data on currency, banking and sovereign debt crises from 1970 to 2014. Using event history models and controlling for several alternative explanations of IO survival, we find ample empirical support for the theoretical expectations.
改革还是取代？继承作为政府间组织制度变迁的一种机制
题目：To reform or to replace? Succession as a mechanism of institutional change in intergovernmental organisations
作者：Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni，剑桥大学政治与国际研究系教授；Daniel Verdier，俄亥俄州立大学政治学系荣誉退休教授。
摘要：鉴于正式国际制度协商的高成本，人们普遍希望各国对现有制度进行调整、改革以及重新定位而不是创建一个新制度。然而，在上个世纪，约有60个政府间组织直接由合法的继承者取代。为什么国家有时解散现有的政府间组织，而仅用一个新的政府间组织取代它，并通过制度继承的方式，由新的政府间组织可以接管现任组织的任务和资产？本文提供了一种制度继承的理论并举例说明。与创建新的政府间组织是最后选择的主流观点相反，本文认为，改革和继承都是实现制度变革的权宜之计，但可以解决不同的谈判障碍。通过创建新的制度（而不是对现有制度进行修改）继承绕开了可能阻碍改革的反对者。但是经济会受到潜在规模不经济影响（因为不是现有IGO的每个成员都可以加入继任组织），而改革不会受此影响。改革会优于继承还是相反取决于哪个谈判占据上风。本文的分析推进了现有对制度竞争的理解以及国际组织生命周期内的变化。
Given high costs of negotiating formal international institutions, states are widely expected to adapt, reform, and repurpose existing institutions rather than create new ones. Nevertheless, during the past century some 60 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been directly replaced by a legal successor. Why do states sometimes dissolve an existing IGO only to replace it with a new one that takes over the incumbent organization’s mandate and assets—a practice known as institutional succession? We offer a theory of institutional succession and illustrate with examples. Against the dominant belief that creating new IGOs is a choice of last resort, we argue that reform and succession are equally expedient tools for achieving institutional change but address different negotiating hurdles. By creating a new institution (as opposed to amending an existing one) succession bypasses veto players that may stunt reform. However, succession suffers from potential diseconomies-of-scale (since not every member of an existing IGO may join the successor) which reform does not. Depending on which negotiation hurdle prevails, reform will be preferred to succession or vice versa. Our analysis advances existing understandings of institutional contestation and change within the life cycle of an international organisation.
联合国大会领导人：振兴还是政治化？
题目：Leaders in the United Nations General Assembly: Revitalization or politicization?
作者：Alexander Baturo，都柏林城市大学法律与政府学院政治学副教授；Julia Gray，宾夕法尼亚大学政治学副教授。
摘要：领导人如何为国际合作服务而向世界发表演讲，他们的信息是会增强还是削弱全球议程？领导人越来越多地出现在联合国大会 （UNGA） 上，这是一个旨在外交而非政治的协商论坛。与此同时，联合国大会长期以来在努力实现振兴，领导人的贡献可能会确保更有意义的合作。基于领导人沟通理论，本文认为，与其他国家代表相比，国家元首有更多的余地来偏离大会的优先议程;作为政治家，他们有动力讨论他们自己关注的更具体的主题。根据领导人在联合国大会上演讲的新数据，本文使用文本分析来表明领导人倾向于偏离会议的政策议程。此外，国家领导人的发言更加直白，往往围绕自身展开，背离了外交辩论的惯例。这表明，虽然领导人的出席可能会为联合国大会带来更多的宣传和知名度，但他们的贡献也可能破坏常规辩论。本文的研究结果揭示了领导者如何将多边合作政治化的方式，并为个人在国际组织活力中的作用提供了证据。
How do leaders address the world in service of international cooperation, and do their messages enhance or detract from the global agenda? Leaders increasingly appear at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a deliberative forum meant for diplomacy, not politics. At the same time, the UNGA has long undergone revitalization efforts, and leaders’ contributions could potentially ensure more meaningful cooperation. Building on theories of leader communication, we argue that, in contrast to other country representatives, heads of state have more leeway to deviate from the assembly’s priorities; as politicians, they have incentives to discuss their own, more particularistic, topics. Drawing from novel data on leaders’ speeches in the UNGA, we use text analytics to show that leaders tend to depart from the policy agenda of the session. Furthermore, national political leaders speak more plainly, centering speech on themselves and departing from the general conventions of diplomatic debate. This suggests that, while leaders’ attendance potentially generates more publicity and visibility for the UNGA, their contributions may also undermine the general debate. Our findings shed light on the ways in which leaders can politicize mulitlateral cooperation, and we give evidence for the role of individuals in the vitality of international organizations.
扩大还是捍卫合法性？为什么国际组织加强自我合法化
题目：Expanding or defending legitimacy? Why international organizations intensify self-legitimation
作者：Henning Schmidtke，德国全球与区域研究所副教授; Tobias Lenz，德国全球与区域研究所副教授。
摘要：近几十年来，国际组织在努力证明其权威方面的努力有所加强。现有研究表明，鉴于公众的批评，国际组织代表已经扩大了自我合法性，以捍卫其组织的合法性。相比之下，本文表明，当国际组织的权威增加时会加强自我合法化，以动员相关受众的额外支持。本文认为，自我合法化旨在实现主动的合法性扩展，而不是被动的合法性保护。本文通过三个步骤来阐述这一论点。首先，本文借鉴组织社会学和管理研究，将自我合法化与组织生命阶段之间的联系理论化。其次，本文引入了一个关于 1980 年至 2019 年间 28 个区域国际组织自我合法化的新数据集，并表明自我合法化的强度会在各阶段发展。第三，本文提供了多元统计分析和关于非洲联盟的简短案例，这两者都表明，从一致性或共识决策转变为多数投票的国际组织，往往会加强自我合法化。
Recent decades have seen an intensification of international organizations’ (IOs) attempts to justify their authority. The existing research suggests that IO representatives have scaled up self-legitimation to defend their organizations’ legitimacy in light of public criticism. In contrast, this article demonstrates that IOs intensify self-legitimation to mobilize additional support from relevant audiences when their authority increases. We argue that self-legitimation aims primarily to achieve proactive legitimacy expansion instead of reactive legitimacy protection. We develop this argument in three steps. First, we draw on organizational sociology and management studies to theorize the connection between self-legitimation and an organization’s life stages. Second, we introduce a novel dataset on the self-legitimation of 28 regional IOs between 1980 and 2019 and show that the intensity of self-legitimation evolves in phases. Third, we provide a multivariate statistical analysis and a brief vignette on the African Union, both of which indicate that IOs that shift from unanimity or consensus to majority voting tend to intensify self-legitimation.
条约的退出和国际法的发展
题目：Treaty withdrawal and the development of international law
作者：Averell Schmidt，哈佛大学肯尼迪学院公共政策博士候选人。
摘要：本文认为，退出条约对国际法的发展有两个相反的影响。首先，它通过推动其余成员国通过改革来维持合作，从而直接影响条约发生的地方。其次，它通过破坏退出国与其他成员国之间的外交关系，阻碍其他合作领域的谈判，间接影响其他条约的发展。因此，退出条约对国际法的发展产生了混合影响：它加速了一项条约的改革，同时抑制了其他方面的改革。本文通过将双重差分设计应用于根据联合国记录构建的原创条约面板数据集来检验这一论点。研究结果表明，虽然退出会增加发生退出的条约中的改革数量，但却减少了在具有相似成员资格的类似条约中的改革数量。间接效应不仅抵消了直接效应。总体而言，条约的退出阻碍了新国际法的制定。
I argue that treaty withdrawal has two opposing effects on the development of international law. First, it directly impacts the treaty where it occurs by pushing the remaining members to adopt reforms to maintain cooperation. Second, it indirectly affects the development of other treaties by damaging diplomatic relations between the withdrawing state and other members, hindering negotiations in other areas of cooperation. Consequentially, treaty withdrawal has a mixed impact on the development of international law: it expedites the reform of one treaty while inhibiting reform elsewhere. I test this argument by applying a difference-in-differences design to an original panel of treaties built from the records of the United Nations. My findings reveal that while withdrawal increases the number of reforms in treaties where it occurs, it decreases reforms in similar treaties with comparable memberships. The indirect effect more than cancels out the direct effect. Overall, treaty withdrawal impedes the creation of new international laws.
公众支持退出国际组织：来自美国的实验证据
题目：Public support for withdrawal from international organizations: Experimental evidence from the US
作者：Inken von Borzyskowski，牛津大学圣凯瑟琳学院国际关系教授；Felicity Vabulas，佩珀代因大学国际研究教授。
摘要：美国帮助创建和领导了许多国际组织。然而，在过去六年中，美国宣布退出包括世界卫生组织、联合国教科文组织和万国邮政联盟在内的多个国际组织。美国人民关心美国退出国际组织吗？美国人何时支持退出国际组织并支持提出这一点的候选人？本文认为，美国人对多边主义的支持往往会按照党派路线进行分裂，而退出国际组织可以激活这些偏好。本文还认为，将退出国际组织定性为有利于美国的国家利益，可以使美国人更有可能支持退出国际组织。2016年至2020年特朗普政府期间的四次美国调查实验的数据支撑了这些论点。民主党人倾向于反对退出国际组织，而共和党人倾向于支持这一做法。此外，结果表明，退出国际组织（及其框架）会影响候选人的选择和政策支持。这表明宣布退出国际组织可以用来争取国内选举支持。尽管如此，数据还显示，即使国际组织存在不完善或挑战性，仍有相当大比例的美国公众认为留在国际组织中是重要的。在这些情况下，本文注意到沉没成本谬误、现状偏差和损失厌恶可能会成为支持退出的阻力点。本文的研究结果对关于国际合作的公众舆论、对国际组织的抵制及其生命周期的研究具有重要意义。
The United States has helped create and lead many international organizations (IOs). Yet in the last six years, the US announced its withdrawal from several IOs including the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union. Do Americans care about US withdrawals from IOs? When do Americans support withdrawing from IOs and support candidates who propose this? We argue that Americans’ support for multilateralism tends to divide along party lines, and that IO withdrawal can activate those preferences. We also argue that framing an IO withdrawal as benefiting US national interests can make Americans more likely to favor IO exit. Data from four US survey experiments during the 2016–2020 Trump administration support these arguments. Democrats tend to oppose IO withdrawals while Republicans tend to support them. Further, results show that IO withdrawal (and how it is framed) affects candidate choice and policy support. This suggests that announcing IO withdrawal can be used to rally domestic electoral support. Still, the data also show that a large proportion of the US public values remaining in IOs, even when IOs are imperfect or challenging. In these cases, we note that sunk cost fallacies, status quo bias, and loss aversion may pose friction points for supporting withdrawal. Our findings have important implications for research on public opinion about international cooperation, backlash against IOs, and their life cycles.
编译 | 林志俊
审校 | 赖永祯
排版 | 张奕睿
本文源于《国际组织评论》(RIO), Vol. 19, No. 4, October 2024，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。
