期刊简介

《太平洋评论》（The Pacific Review）是太平洋地区研究的主要平台，作为跨学科期刊，其宗旨和目标为打破研究领域之间以及学术界、新闻界、政府和商界之间的壁垒，重点关注政策问题。根据Journal Citation Reports显示，2019年该刊的影响因子为1.633，在区域研究类SSCI期刊中排名11/77，在国际关系类SSCI期刊中排名第35/95。

本期目录

1

中等国家在缅甸 2011-2021年和平进程中 “缔造和平倡导者 ”的角色

Middle powers as ‘peacemaking entrepreneurs’ in Myanmar’s peace process 2011–2021

2

金融方略与中等强国的多样性：评估韩国在区域金融合作中的战略参与

The varieties of financial statecraft and middle powers: assessing South Korea’s strategic involvement in regional financial cooperation

3

关于韩国应对朝鲜导弹试验的政策启发分析

A poliheuristic analysis of South Korea’s responses towards North Korea’s missile tests.

4

安全化、框架校准与美国对华芯片出口管制的合法化

Securitization, frame alignment, and the legitimation of US chip export controls on China

5

中国的 “如我所行” 范式：基于实践的南方国家规范外交

China’s ‘do-as-I-do’ paradigm: practice-based normative diplomacy in the global South

内容摘要

中等强国在缅甸 2011-2021年和平进程中 “缔造和平倡导者 ”的角色

题目：Middle powers as ‘peacemaking entrepreneurs’ in Myanmar’s peace process 2011–2021

作者简介：Chiraag Roy（澳大利亚外交贸易部政策官员），Anthony Ware (迪肯大学国际与社区发展副教授), Costas Laoutides (迪肯大学艺术与教育学院国际关系副教授)。

摘要：从 2011 年缅甸和平进程开始到 2021 年政变前，中等强国一直是缅甸和平捐助方面的重要角色。考虑到缅甸长期以来对中国的依赖以及与大国之间普遍存在的困难关系，这一点似乎意义重大。然而，尽管有关中等强国的文献一直在提及它们的调停能力，但由于定义不明确，因此很难应用这一术语。最近有学者运用 “倡导者 ”视角来理解中等强国的行为，暗示中等强国是由物质和意识形态因素共同驱动的。本文基于对挪威、日本和澳大利亚2011-2021年参与缅甸缔造和平活动的五十多名知情者进行的实地访谈，对企业家标签进行了扩展，并认为缅甸的中等强国扮演着缔造和平倡导者的角色--他们利用自己缔造和平的声誉来获取相应的物质利益。然而，本文认为，在缅甸的情况下，参与建立和平的倡导者精神被证明是有问题的，因为它往往有利于当权者。事实上，与这些行为者作为中立中间人的理论假设截然不同，本文对中等强国在缔造和平中的贡献提出了严肃的质疑。

Middle powers were visible actors in Myanmar’s peace-donor landscape, from the beginning of that country’s peace process in 2011 until the 2021 coup. Considering Myanmar’s longstanding dependency on China and generally difficult relationship with larger powers, this appears to be significant. However, the literature on middle powers remains incapacitated by a definitional opacity that makes application of the term difficult, despite consistent references to their mediating capabilities. Recent scholarship has applied an ‘entrepreneurial’ lens to understanding middle power behaviour, implying middle powers are driven by a confluence of material and ideational factors. Based on fieldwork interviews with over fifty informants examining Norwegian, Japanese and Australian engagement with peacemaking in Myanmar 2011–2021, this paper expands on the entrepreneurial label and argues that middle powers in Myanmar acted as peacemaking entrepreneurs—as actors that traded upon their peacemaking reputations to secure concomitant material benefits. Nevertheless, this paper argues that engaging in peacemaking entrepreneurship proved to be problematic in Myanmar’s context, given it tended to favour incumbent power. Indeed, in stark contrast to theoretical assumptions of these actors as neutral intermediaries, this paper raises serious questions about the contribution of middle powers in peacemaking.

金融方略与中等强国的多样性：评估韩国在区域金融合作中的战略参与

题目：The varieties of financial statecraft and middle powers: assessing South Korea’s strategic involvement in regional financial cooperation

作者简介：Yaechan Lee（立命馆亚洲太平洋大学亚洲太平洋研究学院学部），William W. Grimes（波士顿大学 Frederick S. Pardee 全球研究学院国际关系教授），William N. Kring （波士顿大学全球发展政策中心的执行主任）。

摘要：近年来，金融方略文献已从关注大国扩展到新兴大国的行为。虽然这些文献做出了重要的纠正，但它们尚未充分探讨新兴大国的各种金融方略。特别是，本文认为，地区中等强国的行为与地区大国不同，即使它们在全球层面拥有相似的能力。例如，印度和韩国在金融方略文献中都被归类为新兴力量，并运用地区战略以降低其金融脆弱性。但在实践中，两国的金融方略却明显不同。印度寻求挑战全球现状并影响邻国，而韩国则追求更为温和的防御性目标。借鉴中等强国的文献，我们假设中等强国在其本土地区的相对地位可以解释其金融外交的这种差异。为了证明这种方法的实用性，我们考察了韩国在亚太地区的金融外交。我们发现，韩国作为地区中等强国的地位可以有效解释其在货币领域的双边和区域合作模式。

In recent years, the financial statecraft literature has expanded from a focus on great powers to encompass the behavior of emerging powers. While offering an important corrective, the literature does not yet adequately address the full variety of the emerging powers’ strategies of financial statecraft. In particular, we argue that regional middle powers behave differently from regional great powers even when they have similar capacities at the global level. For instance, both India and South Korea are categorized as emerging powers in the financial statecraft literature and deploy regional strategies to reduce their financial vulnerability. Yet their financial statecraft strategies have clearly differed in practice. India has sought to challenge the global status quo and influence its neighbors, while South Korea has pursued more modest and defensive goals. Drawing on the middle power literature, we posit that middle powers’ relative position within their home regions explains such differences among the financial statecraft of emerging powers. To demonstrate the utility of this approach, we examine South Korea’s financial statecraft in the Asia-Pacific region. We find that its position as a regional middle power effectively explains its patterns of bilateral and regional cooperation in the monetary sphere.

关于韩国应对朝鲜导弹试验的政策启发分析

题目： A poliheuristic analysis of South Korea’s responses towards North Korea’s missile tests

作者简介：Pelin Dengiz（比勒肯特大学国际关系系硕士研究生）。

摘要：进入二十一世纪以来，朝鲜的导弹计划取得了不可否认的发展势头，对地区内的对话高度敏感。有人可能会说韩国已经习惯了这些重复发射的导弹飞入太平洋，有时一年内会发射二十几枚，但在应对邻国的侵略时，韩国也有自己的政策选择。为了理解韩国的决策机制，本文运用了明茨（Mintz）提出的 “政策启发理论”（Poliheuristic Theory）。作者运用了在 2013 年、2017 年和 2022 年的三个危机时刻，由三种政策选择（消极待命、主动出击、联合演习）组成的决策矩阵。数据收集采用了第一手和第二手资料，如国防部新闻稿和新闻报道。朝鲜的试验受到韩国的密切关注，但通常不会对挑衅行为做出回应。当韩国决定做出回应时，倾向于以联合国公约、停战协定等为由，将问题推向国际受众。美军在半岛的存在起着至关重要的作用，这一点从美国宣布将减少军事介入后显著增加的试验中可以看出。一些国内和地区标准（阳光政策、最终统一的可能性、美国的军事存在、非对称能力、地区现状）可能会对领导人的反应产生影响。

The North Korean missile program has gained undeniable momentum in the twenty first century, highly sensitive to dialogues within the region. One could argue South Korea is accustomed to these repetitive launches splashing into the Pacific Ocean, at times nearing two dozen in a year, but the republic has its sets of policy alternatives when responding to the neighbor’s aggression. To understand South Korea’s decision-making mechanism, I utilize the ‘Poliheuristic Theory’ developed by Mintz. A decision matrix consisting of three policy alternatives (passive by-standing, reaching out, joint drills) is applied to three crisis moments from 2013, 2017, 2022. Primary and secondary sources like defense ministry press releases and news reports are used for data collection. The North’s tests are closely observed by the South but usually not responded to provocations. When South Korea decides to respond, the tendency is to carry the issue to the international audience by citing U.N. Convention, Armistice Agreement, etc. The presence of the U.S. military in the peninsula plays a crucial role, as seen from the remarkably increased tests after the U.S. declared it would lessen military involvement. Several domestic and regional criteria (the Sunshine Policy, eventual unification possibility, U.S. military presence, asymmetrical capabilities, regional status quo) has possible influence over leaders’ responses.

安全化、框架调整与美国对华芯片出口管制的合法化

题目：Securitization, frame alignment, and the legitimation of US chip export controls on China

作者简介：杨海（澳门大学政府与公共行政学系助理教授）。

摘要：本文探讨了拜登政府如何试图使针对中国的广泛芯片出口管制（2022 年 10 月 7 日出台）合法化，并说服盟国采取类似措施。本研究以对美国官方文件的定性分析为基础，不仅总结了美国官员提出的主要理由，而且还分析了中国在芯片出口管制方面所面临的挑战：中国不受管制地获取先进芯片对美国和盟国的安全构成了重大威胁。更重要的是，本研究通过对框架调整的洞察，揭示了合法化暨安全化过程的基本模式和动态。从实质上讲，美国官员坚持从安全角度看待美国的技术领先地位和出口管制的升级，将中国使用先进芯片与美国技术优势、军事安全和国家安全的削弱联系起来，并将阻止中国获得先进芯片视为美国和盟国安全的关键。这一分析为中美关系中一个日益普遍却又潜在有害的现象--以国家安全的名义实施技术经济制裁--的争论与合法化提供了丰富的见解。

This article examines how the Biden administration sought to legitimate the wide-ranging chip export controls on China (introduced on 7 October 2022) and to convince allies to adopt similar measures. Grounded in a qualitative analysis of US official documents, this study not only draws out the overarching rationale advanced by US officials: China’s unregulated access to advanced chips constitutes a major threat to the US and allied security. More importantly, leveraging insights from frame alignment, it uncovers the underlying patterns and dynamics of the legitimation-cum-securitization process. Substantively, US officials insisted on viewing US technological leadership and the escalation of export controls through the security lens, associated China’s (mis)use of advanced chips with the erosion of US technological supremacy, military security and national security at large, and framed blocking China’s access to advanced chips as critical for the security of the US and allies. This analysis offers broad insights into the contestation and legitimation of an increasingly common yet potentially pernicious phenomenon in US-China relations: enacting techno-economic sanctions in the name of national security.

中国的 “如我所行” 范式：基于实践的南方国家规范外交

题目：China’s ‘do-as-I-do’ paradigm: practice-based normative diplomacy in the global South

作者简介：Jeremy Garlick（捷克布拉格经济大学国际关系学院国际研究中心、国际与外交研究系副教授），Fangxing Qin，北京外国语大学欧洲语言文化学院讲师。

摘要：中国在全球南方的影响力既包括物质层面，也包括观念层面。在 “一带一路 ”倡议（BRI）时代，物质方面包括货物贸易、基础设施建设、原材料和能源进口。观念方面包括政治影响和传播中国规范的尝试，其中一些规范与所谓的 “自由国际秩序 ”中的规范不同。本文认为，中国在全球南方的规范传播是通过基于实践的规范外交进行的，其中包括话语和非话语实践。从理论上讲，中国的规范应该由合作伙伴共同制定，笔者称之为 “获得认可”。在实践中，中国希望非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲的伙伴国在行为和言论上以前者为榜样，而非提出重大争议。本文的分析表明，中国的规范外交已在一定程度上赢得了认可和影响，因为全球南方的行为体已开始按照前者所期望的规范性路线，而不是西方主导的自由国际秩序所规定的路线来改变自己的行为。然而，中国的话语实践并未获得与非话语实践同等程度的认可，这为西方大国的反倡议行动留下了空间。

China’s influence in the global South has both material and ideational aspects. In the era of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), material aspects include trade in goods, infrastructure-building, and imports of raw materials and energy. Ideational aspects include political influence and attempts to diffuse Chinese norms, some of which differ from those enshrined in the so-called ‘liberal international order’. This paper posits that China’s norm diffusion in the global South is attempted via practice-based normative diplomacy which includes both discursive and non-discursive practices. In theory, Chinese norms are supposed to be co-constituted by partners in a process we call ‘earning recognition’. In practice, the Chinese government expects partner countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to model their behaviour and discourse on the example set by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) without significant contestation. Our analysis demonstrates that the PRC’s normative diplomacy has achieved a degree of earned recognition and influence, in that actors in the global South have begun to alter their behaviour along the normative lines expected by Beijing rather than those enshrined in the Western-led liberal international order. However, Chinese discursive practices have not met with the same degree of recognition as non-discursive ones, leaving space for counter-initiatives from the Western powers.

编译 | 王诗涵

审校 | 张潇文

排版 | 吉红燕

本文源于《太平洋评论》（PR）, Volume 37, Issue 5 (2024)，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。